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Abstract 
 
This paper advertises a new account of computational implementation. According          
to the resemblance account, implementation is a matter of resembling a           
computational architecture. The resemblance account departs from previous        
theories by denying that computational architectures are exhausted by their          
formal, mathematical features. Instead, they are taken to be permeated with           
causality, spatiotemporality, and other non-mathematical features. I argue that this          
approach comports well with computer scientific practice, and offers a novel           
response to so-called triviality arguments. 
 
1. Theories of Implementation 
Theories of physical computation address two questions: 
Q1. What distinguishes physical systems that compute from those that don’t? 
Q2. Among physical computing systems, what distinguishes those that compute the same 
thing from those that don’t? 
(1)  concerns the difference between laptops and calculators on the one hand, and rocks and 
tables on the other. (2), by contrast, concerns the distinction between one laptop computing dot 
products and another computing Fourier transforms. An adequate account of physical 
computation should answer both (Sprevak 2019). 
Different answers to Q1 and Q2 are possible. I shall be concerned with ​implementationist 
theories, which hold that a physical system computes if it implements some computational 
system, or 'computation', for short.  Thus: 2
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2 What of alternatives to implementationism? On one reading, Piccinini’s (2015) mechanistic account answers Q1 
and Q2 by direct appeal to the notion of a computing mechanism. So construed, the implementation relation plays 
no part in the mechanistic account. This sort of approach is worth exploring, but is beyond the present scope. 
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A1. A physical system computes just in case it implements some computation. 
A2. What a physical system computes is determined by the computation it implements. 
These answers are schematic, however. They say little about what computations are, and 
what implementation amounts to. Different accounts of implementation emerge from different 
specifications of these details. 
This paper introduces a new account implementation, which I call the ​resemblance 
account​. I sketch the account in Sections 2 - 4. Section 5 deals with some background 
metaphysical issues. Sections 6 argues that the resemblance offers an interesting new perspective 
on some old problems in the philosophy of physical computation. Finally, Section 7 deals with 
an objection, and Section 8 concludes. 
A caveat before proceeding. My main aim is advertisement: to show that the resemblance 
account offers a novel approach to physical computation, worthy of further investigation. 
Regrettably, however, this means some issues won’t receive the treatment they deserve. These 
issues must wait for another occasion, and I’ll flag them as they arise.  
 
2. The Resemblance Account 
I propose to begin at the beginning. In his landmark 1936 paper, Turing offers the 
following description of an ​a​-machine: 
 
The machine is supplied with a "tape " (the analogue of paper) running through it, and 
divided into sections (called "squares") each capable of bearing a "symbol" … the 
configuration [of the machine] determines the possible behaviour of the machine. In 
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some of the configurations in which the scanned square is blank (i.e. bears no symbol) 
the machine writes down a new symbol on the scanned square: in other configurations it 
erases the scanned symbol. The machine may also change the square which is being 
scanned, but only by shifting it one place to right or left. (Turing 1936, 231) 
 
As we know, Turing arrived at this conception of ​a​-machines by carefully considering the 
activity of human workers proceeding effectively. The restriction that ​a​-machines may only 
'observe' one symbol at a time, for instance, is justified on the grounds that human workers can 
only distinguish between finitely many different primitive symbol types. (For, if not, then we 
could distinguish between (tokens of) types which differ to an arbitrarily small degree. But our 
perceptual apparatus is not nearly as sophisticated as this. See Turing (1936, 249 - 252) and Sieg 
(2009) for discussion.) 
The importance of Turing's insight is not hard to appreciate. By linking the 
characterization of an ​a​-machine directly to the activities of actual human workers, Turing's 
analysis sheds light on the computational capacities and limitations of humans working 
effectively. Very roughly, the computational power of ​a​-machines bears on the computational 
power of effective human workers because the former resemble the latter in certain important 
respects: both have certain 'perceptual' limitations, both follow only finitely many instructions 
one at a time, and so on. Indeed, alternative analyses, such as λ-definability or Herbrand-Godel 
general recursivity, were unsatisfactory because they fail to adequately illuminate the basic 
activities of a human working effectively. 
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I mention all of this because it seems to me that Turing's analysis contains the essentials 
of the resemblance account. ​A​-machines bear on the computational powers of human workers 
because, and to the extent that, the former resemble the latter in certain respects. The 
resemblance account generalizes and precisifies this insight. On the resemblance account, 
physical computation is a matter of resembling a computational architecture: 
 
The Resemblance Account.​ A physical system computes just in case, and to the extent 
that, it resembles a computational architecture. 
 
In the following two sections I flesh out the notion of a computational architecture, and 
explain the notion of resemblance at play. But it should be noted that while I talk of ​the 
resemblance account, really I am scouting a family of views. Different ways of filling in the 
sketch I give deliver different particular resemblance accounts. I will mention the major 
choice-points as they arise. 
 
3. Computational Architectures 
Turing's ​a​-machines are an example of what I'll call a ​computational architecture​. To a 
first approximation, computational architectures are ‘blueprints’ for physical computing devices. 
Blueprints 'specify' which features a system must have in order to count as a computing device of 
a particular sort (I return to the question of what ‘blueprints’ are, and what  'specification' 
amounts to, in Section 5). Turing’s description, for instance, constitutes a blueprint which 
specifies the features a physical system must have in order to ‘counts as’ an ​a​-machine. 
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Accordingly, a physical system performs ​a​-machine computations only if it has these features 
too. Anything lacking these features doesn’t count as an ​a​-machine, hence ​a fortiori​ doesn’t 
perform ​a​-machine computations either.  
But what are these features? Some concern the physical or mechanical features of the 
device. For instance, Turing's characterization requires that ​a​-machines ​scan​ the tape, ​write 
symbols, and ​shift​ left or right, that they have a ​read/write head​ and a ​tape​ divided into squares, 
and that latter machine states be ​determined​ by earlier states. Other features are more abstract, 
and concern the patterns or regularities the machine or its components exhibit. Others still 
concern what states of the device represent. The symbols on the tape refer to natural numbers, for 
instance, and a machine as a whole may be taken to represent, in some sense, the function it 
computes. The upshot of all of this is that a physical must exhibit these sorts of features if it is to 
‘count as’ an ​a​-machine, or if it is to perform ​a​-machine computations. 
However, while Turing’s characterization is illustrative, it is not representative of 
contemporary computer design. For a state-of-the-art understanding of computer architectures (in 
the present sense), we should look to work on computer architecture and engineering. These 
disciplines truck in highly specific descriptions of computational architectures. For instance, for 
a physical system to count as a MIPS (Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipelined Stages) 
microarchitecture, it must exhibit a highly specific set of features.  Some of these features are 3
described explicitly in the microarchitecture description, for instance that the system have a 
datapath with a certain pipelining scheme, certain components for sign extension operations, and 
so on. Others are left tacit, such as the requirement that the system be cast in a silicon wafer, that 
3 See Harris and Harris (2013). 
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it have a certain clock rate, and so on. As in the ​a​-machine case, nothing counts as a MIPS 
microarchitecture unless it has these features. 
Stepping back, it seems to me that three kinds of features are commonly cited in the 
descriptions offered by computer architects and engineers. ​Physico-mechanical features ​concern 
the physical and micro-physical structure of a system: its components and their relationships, 
interactions, and composition. Other features concern the patterns or regularities exhibited by 
various states and components, and I’ll call these features ​syntactic​. Finally, ​semantic​ or 
representational​ features concern what the states or processes of the device represent. However, 
I don't take this list to exhaust the features that may be specified by a computational architecture. 
Indeed, it would be a mistake to try to specify such a list once-and-for-all. Instead, we should 
regard this list as open to addition or amendment, as computer engineers and architects devise 
new sorts of computing systems with new and different sorts of features.  
Computational architectures can be more or less fine-grained. Some omit irrelevant 
details, as when they indicate that one must build a column that supports 500kg, but does not say 
whether it must be made of wood or stone. Others are more exacting, and demand that a five 
meter tall fluted marble column be put here with such-and-such capital ornaments. Similarly, in 
the computational case we might be told that the device is to have a read/write head, but not told 
what it is made of. Other times we are told that the device must be made of silicon, have 500MB 
of L3 cache, have four cores, run at 2.4GHz, and so forth.  
However, the question of which specific physico-mechanical, syntactic, or semantic 
properties are required for computation is best left to computer scientists and engineers. It is a 
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highly non-trivial task designing a computing system, involving a tremendous amount of 
epistemic labour.  Consequently, I doubt that philosophers have much to contribute on this front.  4
 
4. Resemblance 
The next task is to say what it is for a physical system to ‘resemble’ a computational 
architecture. This marks a choice point in the theory. Some philosophers might be content to rest 
with an intuitive, or commonsensical, notion of resemblance. This is fine as far as it goes, but 
there are benefits to working with a more precise account, and here I will offer one. 
To a very rough first approximation, the idea pursued here is that a physical system 
resembles a computational architecture to the extent that it (a) has features ‘specified’ by the 
architecture, and (b) lacks features ​not​ ‘specified’ by the architecture. A physical system 
resembles an ​a​-machine, for instance, to the extent that it has a read/write head, a control unit, 
tape, and so on. (What it is for an architecture to ‘specify’ a feature depends to some extent on 
one's background metaphysics; see Section 5 for more.) 
Recent work on similarity can be used to make this precise.  On this theory, resemblance 5
is always determined relative to a distinguished class of features ​F​, called the feature set. If ​C​ is a 
computational architecture and ​P​ is a physical system, we’ll let  be the featuresF C ⊆ F  
specified by ​C​ and  be the set of features of ​P​. Then we can say that ​P​ resembles ​C​,F P ⊆ F  
with respect to ​F​, to degree ​n​, just in case  
4 To get a sense of the complexity involved, note that a modest contemporary microprocessor houses approximately 
4.5 billion transistors, and executes upwards of 140 instructions in parallel. 
5 The account presented here follows Weisberg’s ‘weighted feature-matching account’ (2012). For recent criticisms 
and elaborations, see Parker (2015) and Fang (2017). Some philosophers distinguish between resemblance and 
similarity, but here I use the terms interchangeably. 
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 F | F | |F | n| C ⋂ F P − | C − F P −  P − F C =  (1) 
For convenience, I’ll write ​Res(F, C, P) = n​. Here  are the features shared by ​CF C ⋂ F P  
and ​P​. are the features specified by ​C​ which ​P​ lacks. And are the featuresF C − F P F P − F C  
had by ​C​ not specified by A. This equation, in effect, measures the extent to which ​P​ ‘fits’ ​C​’s 
specification.  
This account treats resemblance as a graded notion. I think this is the most basic notion of 
resemblance, and we can use it to define other notions as the need arises. For instance, we can 
say that ​P​ ​perfectly​ ​resembles​ ​C​ just in case ​Res(F, C, P) = n​ and . Similarly, weF | n| C ⋂ F P =   
can say that ​C​ and ​P​ ​resemble each other simpliciter​ just in case ​Res(F, C, P) ≥ m​, for some 
predetermined ‘cutoff’ degree of resemblance ​m​. For present purposes I think it is enough to 
work with the basic notion, but I am open to the possibility that a more refined notion is 
appropriate for thinking about implementation.  
Given this account of resemblance, implementation is in the first instance a matter of 
degree, so that a physical system implements a given computational architecture to a greater or 
lesser degree. Some philosophers might be uncomfortable with this result, preferring an absolute 
notion of implementation instead. But as I just mentioned, given a graded notion of 
implementation we can use it to define an absolute notion if we want. Moreover, there is some 
independent reason for working with a graded notion. Computer scientists often talk about 
different physical systems being better or worse implementations of a given architecture. This 
practice is naturally understood as relying on a graded notion of implementation, and it’s not 
clear how to capture this talk, without distortion, with an absolute notion. 
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One further issue deserves comment. Exactly what degree of resemblance is required for 
implementation? On the one hand, perfect resemblance seems too exacting: it seems useful to 
allow that a physical system may implement an architecture even when they don’t perfectly 
resemble each other. On the other, too low a degree threatens to trivialize the notion of physical 
computation: there are plausibly some simple physico-mechanical properties shared by 
paradigmatically non-computing systems and any computational architecture. With this 
complication flagged, I will simply say that implementation requires a ‘sufficiently high’ degree 
of resemblance, noting that this is just a placeholder for what will undoubtedly be a complicated 
theory of just what a ‘sufficiently high’ degree amounts to. 
 
5. Interlude: Matters of Metaphysics 
So far I've glossed computational architectures as 'blueprints', and I’ve said that 
blueprints ‘specify’ features. But what does all this mean? Presumably we don't wish to add 
'blueprints' as a new fundamental to our ontology, so we'd better find a way to cash them out in 
more familiar terms.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this marks another choice point for the theory. There are different 
ways of cashing out the notion of a blueprint, according to different tastes in background 
metaphysics. Here I'll mention two, but I don’t take these to exhaust the alternatives. In fact, I 
think the resemblance account can be developed in a way that accommodates a wide variety of 
views in metaphysics, and I take this to be a virtue of the account. 
One option takes computational architectures to be highly specific universals. In this 
case, implementation boils down to instantiation, and a computational architecture ‘specifies’ a 
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class of features in something like the way that conjunctive universal ‘specifies’ its conjuncts, for 
instance by having them as parts. So construed, Turing’s description of ​a​-machines is a 
description of a universal, the instantiation of which is a matter of having a read/write head, a 
tape, and so forth. A physical system will instantiate a computational architecture more or less, to 
the degree that it instantiates the conjuncts that compose the architecture in question. In this case, 
Res(F, C, P)​ is a measure of the degree of instantiation of a given universal. 
Philosophers who balk at universals will prefer a more deflationary approach. Here too 
there are many options available. One treats computational architectures as abstract particulars, 
perhaps in something like the way that some scientific models are said to be abstract particulars.  6
On this account, computational architectures are taken to literally​ have​ certain 
physico-mechanical, syntactic, or semantic features. In this case, resemblance amounts to 
property sharing, so that ​Res(F, C, P)​ is a measure of the degree to which ​P​ has features also had 
by ​C​. And other deflationary approaches are possible too. For instance, we might take 
computational architectures to be linguistic entities -- descriptions, say -- so that implementation 
boils down to some sort of semantic relation, such as accurate description. Degree of 
resemblance then amounts to how well a given computational architecture describes a given 
physical system.  
At any rate, which way you go turns, to a large extent, on your ontological tastes. I take it 
to be a virtue of the resemblance account that it can be developed in a way that satisfies a wide 
variety of ontological palates. 
6 See, e.g., Giere (1988, Chapter 3). A related approach, although arguably more deflationary, is found in 
Godfrey-Smith (2009), who suggests that models are fictional entities. Copeland and Shagrir  mention, but do not 
endorse, a view of computation in this vicinity too. As they explain, their view “recognizes an ontological level 
lying between the realization (or physical-device) level and the level of pure-mathematical ontology ... At this level 
are to be found notional or idealized machines that are rich with spatio-temporality and causality” (2011, 234). 
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 6. Triviality Arguments 
So far I’ve motivated the resemblance account by noting that it matches the thought and 
talk of computer scientists. Computer scientists routinely describe computational architectures, 
such as Turing machines, in spatio-temporal terms. I take it to be a point in favour of the 
resemblance account that it reflects this practice. But the resemblance account is also attractive 
on theoretical grounds. In particular, the resemblance account offers a novel response to 
so-called triviality arguments. This section sketches that response. 
It is instructive to recall how triviality worries emerge for standard theories of 
implementation. The most popular theory holds that implementation is a relation between a 
physical system, on the one hand, and an abstract, mathematical computation on the other. In the 
simplest case a computation is a finite automaton, composed of a finite set of states plus a 
transition function. More complicated computations may include inputs, outputs, or states with 
internal combinatorial structure. These details aside, however, the characteristic feature of the 
received view is that computations are exhaustively characterized by their formal, mathematical 
structure. Following Rescorla (2014), I will call this ​structuralism about implementation​.  7
Structuralism holds that a physical system implements a computation if its state 
transitions ‘mirror’ the state transitions of some formal computation. ‘Mirroring’ is typically 
taken to be a structure-preserving map, or isomorphism, between physical and formal states. 
Thus, according to a simple structuralist view, if C = (S, T) is a computation with states S = {S​1​, 
S​2​, …, S​n​} and transition function T: S → S, we have: 
7 Chalmers (1996) is representative of this approach. Other proponents include Millhouse (2017), Schweizer (2019), 
Sprevak (2010), and Scheutz (2001), among many others. 
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 Structuralism.​ Physical system ​P​ implements computation ​C​ just in case there exists a 
mapping ​f​ from states of P to S such that: if P is in a state P​i​ for which ​f ​(P​i​) = S​k​, and 
T(S​k​) = S​m​, then P goes into state P​j​ for which ​f​(P​j​) = S​m​. 
 
Notoriously, however, mappings are cheap and computations are abundant. For nearly 
every physical system P and every computation C, there is a structure-preserving map between P 
and C, in which case nearly every physical system implements every computation, according to 
(SF). This is the core of the triviality worry.  8
In light of triviality worries, few philosophers endorse structuralism in this unalloyed 
form.  Various additional constraints are added to (SF) in an effort to avoid triviality. Some 9
common requirements are that implementing systems satisfy counterfactual conditionals (Block, 
1995; Copeland, 1996); that they exhibit appropriate causal structure (Chalmers, 1996; Scheutz, 
2001); that distinct physical states be mapped to distinct formal states (Chalmers, 1996; 
Godfrey-Smith, 2009); that only appropriately `natural’ or ‘simple’ physical states feature in the 
mapping (Scheutz, 2001; Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Millhouse, 2017); that the physical states have 
representational properties (Shagrir, 2001, 2018; Sprevak, 2010); or that the physical states be 
states of functional mechanisms (Piccinini, 2012, 2015). And others are surely possible. 
All of these tactics are a kind of ‘bottom up’ response to triviality. They attempt to cut 
down the class of implemented computations by constraining which physical systems figure in 
the preimage of the implementation mapping. Only those with the appropriate counterfactual, 
8 See Sprevak (2019) for more. 
9 Schweizer (2019) is a recent exception. 
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representational, etc. features get in. A ‘top down’ response, by contrast, enriches the account of 
the systems in the image of the mapping. To the extent that formalists take computations to be 
formal, mathematical objects, they ​must​ take bottom up approaches to triviality. The few ‘top 
down’ approaches they can take typically complicate the structure of computations while 
preserving their overall formal, mathematical character. 
Concerning triviality, the resemblance account employs a ‘top down’ response. The 
account denies that computational architectures are exhausted by their formal, mathematical 
features. Instead, they may be replete with physico-mechanical, representational, etc. features. 
Since implementation is a matter of resembling a computational architecture in these respects, 
and since most physical systems ​don't​ have the right arrangement of features, most physical 
systems won't implement many, or even any, computational architectures. For instance, most 
physical systems don't have a read/write head, an indefinitely extensible tape, etc., so most 
systems won't implement ​a​-machines. Similarly, most physical systems aren't composed of a 
silicon board, have a certain pipelining scheme, and so on, so most physical systems don't 
implement a MIPS microarchitecture.  10
There is some reason to be dissatisfied with ‘bottom up’ approaches; here I’ll mention 
just one. The worry is that structuralism cannot adequately explain ​why​ physical computation 
necessarily involves causal, semantic, etc. features.  From the structuralist’s perspective, 11
computation is fundamentally a mathematical phenomenon, captured by pure mathematical 
computing systems such as Turing machines (construed set-theoretically), DFAs, and the like. 
10 However, attentive readers will note that this response turns, to some extent, on the specific choice of features in 
question. There subtleties must await another occasion. 
11 Another is that structuralism fails to capture the implementation conditions of many computational models; see 
Rescorla (2014). 
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Methodologically, the strategy is to ​start​ with a prior mathematical notion of computation, and 
define a notion of physical computation in terms of it.  But given this outlook, the requirement 12
that physical computation essentially involve causal, semantic, etc. features looks less like a 
discovery about the nature of physical computation, and more like an ​ad hoc​ maneuver designed 
to save the theory from triviality. If computation is fundamentally a mathematical phenomenon, 
as the structuralist holds, and if that account of computation leads to trivialization (as it appears 
to), then what could possibly explain why physical computation ​must​ be causal, semantic, or 
whatever? 
This explanatory problem doesn’t arise for the resemblance account. Because the 
resemblance theorist denies that computation is essentially mathematical, there is no ​additional 
task of explaining why physical computation must involve causal-mechanical, representational, 
etc. features. Recall Turing's characterization of ​a​-machines. On that characterization, it is 
constitutive of ​a​-machines that they have a read/write head, that later states be determined by 
earlier states, and so on. From this perspective, ​what it is​ to be an ​a​-machine is just to have these 
features. But since this characterization comes with causal-mechanical features 'built in', so to 
speak, it is straightforward to explain why a physical system must have these features in order to 
carry out ​a​-machine computations. The reason is simply that ​a​-machine computations ​just are​ a 
certain kind of causal-mechanical (etc.) process. From this perspective, a causal-mechanical 
requirement isn’t an ​ad hoc ​maneuver designed to save the theory from triviality, but instead 
reflects a basic fact about the nature of ​a​-machine computations, namely, that they are a kind of 
causal-mechanical process. 
12 See Chalmers (1994, 341-342) for an especially clear statement of this approach. 
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7. Medium Independence 
The resemblance account responds to triviality by enriching the character of implemented 
computations. But this maneuver may seem to cut against the idea, widely endorsed, that 
computations are 'medium independent' (Piccinini 2015, ch. 7). This section explains how a 
suitable stand-in for medium independence can be developed within the resemblance framework. 
To a first approximation, a property or process is medium independent if it can be 
realized in different physical media. ​Cooking lentils​ is not medium independent, because it can 
be realized in only quite specific physical media; ​powering a drivetrain ​is, because it can be 
accomplished by otherwise quite different physical systems (internal combustion engines, 
electric motors, etc.). 
Medium independence is closely related to multiple realizability. A property or process is 
multiply realizable, roughly, if it can be realized by different kinds of physical systems. Medium 
independence entails multiple realizability: if a property or process is medium independent, then 
it can be realized in different physical media. Note, however, that the converse fails. ​Being a 
corkscrew​ is multiply realizable, since many different corkscrew designs might do the trick, but 
not medium independent. ​Being a corkscrew​ is a matter of interacting with a specific physical 
medium, namely cork.  
It seems undeniable that computations are medium independent, hence multiply 
realizable. As Ned Block once pointed out, for instance, an AND-gate might be realized either by 
transistors, or by mice, string, and cheese (Block 1995). Moreover, the literature on 
unconventional computation is replete apparent cases in which the same computation (e.g., a 
sorting task) is performed by wildly different physical systems. But it's not clear that the 
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resemblance account can capture this apparent datum. The trouble is that there appears to be no 
single computational architecture, in the above sense, common to the wide variety of computing 
systems hypothesized by computer scientists. There is no architecture, for instance, which both 
silicon and murine AND gates resemble.  13
What should the resemblance theorist make of this? The solution, I think, becomes clear 
once we reflect on the role played by medium independence (multiple realizability) in 
computational theorizing. In general we require a way to describe physical systems that abstracts 
away from (some of) their physical details. So abstracted, we can consider whether, e.g., two 
systems compute the same logical function despite physical dissimilarities. Now, ordinarily this 
role is played by the alleged medium independence (multiple realizability) of computations. But 
if the resemblance account can supply a way to abstract from physical details, it can furnish a 
way to describe physical systems at the desired level of abstraction. And this, I submit, is just 
what is needed for computational theorizing. The rest of this section explains how this might go. 
To begin, while above resemblance is characterized in terms of a single class of features, 
we can also define a notion of resemblance that discriminates between different classes of 
features. If ​F​1​, F​2​, …, F​m​ are classes of features, then we can say that ​P​ resembles ​C​ with respect 
to F​i​ (1 ≤ i ≤ m) to degree ​n ​ just in case . Moreover, by adding aes(F , , ) n∑
m
i=1
R i P C =   
coefficient to equation (1) we can discount (or boost) the contribution of a particular class of 
features to the overall resemblance score.  Doing so gives 14
 
13 There is, I suppose, a ​disjunctive​ architecture composed of both silicon and murine components. But such a device 
is a metaphysician’s contrivance, not a genuine deliverance of computer science. 
14 Cf. Weisberg (2012). 
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 (2)(|F | F | |F |)x A ⋂ F P − | A − F P −  P − F A   
 
I will write  as shorthand. In general, then, if ℝ (1 ≤ i ≤ m) arees(F , , )R P C = n xi ∈  
coefficients, the generalized resemblance score is given by .es(F , , , ) n∑
m
i=1
R i xi P C =   
By appropriately choosing coefficients we can define a notion of ​pattern resemblance 
between systems. For instance, if ​F​1​, F​2​, F​3​ are classes of physico-mechanical, syntactic, and 
semantic features, respective, with corresponding coefficients ​x​1​, x​2​, x​3​, then by setting ​x​1​ = x​3​ = 
0​ and ​x​2​ = 1​ we can say that P ​pattern resembles​ C to degree ​n​ just in case 
, that P ​pattern resembles C​ simpliciter just in case P pattern resembleses(F , , , ) n∑
3
i=1
R i xi P C =   
C to a high enough degree, and so on.  
How does all this help? Medium independence is naturally thought to concern what I've 
called 'syntactic' features. We say that silicon and mouse-and-string systems compute AND, 
when they do, because at a certain abstract level of description they exhibit the same patterns, 
regardless of their physical substrate. The resemblance account can accommodate this fact by 
noting that different AND gates pattern resemble each other. Thus the resemblance account can 
furnish a level of description appropriate for this part of computational theorizing, without 
abandoning the insight that inclusion of specific physico-mechanical features is central to 
avoiding triviality. 
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8. Summary 
The resemblance account holds that a physical system computes to the extent that it 
resembles a computational architecture. This view is grounded in Turing’s influential approach 
to thinking about computational architectures, an approach which persists in computer science 
today. The view is also motivated on theoretical grounds: it offers a novel and natural response 
to triviality arguments about computational implementation. While I haven’t here attempted an 
exhaustive assessment of the resemblance account, the considerations surveyed here are 
promising. For this reason I take the resemblance account to be worthy of further investigation. 
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